



UNITED STATES ARMS ~~CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY~~
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 WASHINGTON

January 18, 1964

Dear Mr. Conway:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation this morning, I am sending you this letter to bring you up to date on anticipated U.S. initiatives at the ENDC session which commences January 21, 1964. Although final policy determinations have not yet been made on all of the proposed U.S. initiatives, this letter will outline what we anticipate may be proposed and supplement the earlier oral briefings given to you by George Bunn.

I. Nuclear Proposals

1. Of particular interest to the Committee is a proposal we may make to promote a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons use.

We will continue to urge, as we have in the past, an agreement that all countries halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. To give impetus to the proposal, we would state that we are prepared to agree to a shutdown of additional nuclear production facilities on a reciprocal plant-by-plant basis. We would point out that we have already started in this direction and express the hope that the Soviet Union would follow suit. In this connection we would also state that we are prepared to accept international verification to

confirm

Mr. John T. Conway,
 Executive Director,
 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
 Room AE-1, The Capitol.

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confirm the shutdown of some or all of the Plutonium reactors mentioned by the President in his State of the Union message.

2. Nuclear containment initiatives which will probably be advanced by the United States are summarized below:

a. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The United States will continue private discussions with the Soviet Union concerning a declaration that: (a) nuclear powers would refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers; and, (b) non-nuclear powers would not accept such weapons. As Mr. Bunn indicated to you in a letter dated November 21, 1962, these discussions have carried forward the United States position expressed through our support of the 1961 Irish Resolution in the United Nations and by provisions on this subject contained in Stage I of the United States General and Complete Disarmament proposals of September 25, 1961 and April 18, 1962. We will, of course, continue to maintain our position that a NATO multilateral nuclear force is fully consistent with our objective of preventing the spread of national nuclear capabilities.

b. Reciprocal Destruction of Obsolete or Obsolescent Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

We may explore further the reciprocal destruction of B-47's and Badgers and possibly other nuclear delivery vehicles which may be specified by DOD. The Soviet Union has previously rejected the B-47/Badger idea. We now plan to emphasize that the flow of nuclear delivery vehicles to powers not possessing a nuclear capability could increase their incentive to develop such a capability.

c. Transfers

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c. Transfers by Nuclear Countries of Fissionable Material to Non-Nuclear Countries for Peaceful Purposes

Such an agreement may be explored as a way of minimizing the possible development by non-nuclear countries of independent nuclear capabilities. All transfers would be subject to IAEA or similar international safeguards. The delegation may state that the United States is prepared, provided the U.S.S.R. will do likewise, to accept IAEA inspection safeguards for certain peaceful uses facilities on a reciprocal basis. This would emphasize our willingness to accept the same inspection we recommend for other countries. We may also state that the United States is prepared on its own, to extend IAEA safeguards to a large power reactor in the United States to provide experience in the practical operation of such safeguards. We would call upon the Soviet Union to do the same.

d. Reciprocal U.S.-U.S.S.R. Transfers of Large Amounts of Fissionable Materials to Peaceful Purposes.

The United States may reaffirm its previous proposals for such transfers. We would recommend applying the same inspection safeguards that are now applicable to peaceful uses transfers to other countries.

Mr. Bunn discussed such a proposal in his letter to you of November 21, 1962. After probing the Soviet position during the spring of 1963, the United States proposed to the Soviets and at the ENDC the possibility of a separate, appropriately verified measure, involving a United States transfer of 60,000 kgs. of U-235 to non-weapons purposes if the U.S.S.R. would transfer 40,000 kgs. under the same conditions. The

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Soviet response was negative but the U.S. policy initiative outlined in Mr. Bunn's letter, and the reason for it, have not changed.

The rationale behind the unequal transfer proposal was based upon the following considerations:

- (1) The U.S. stockpile is substantially larger than that of the U.S.S.R.;
- (2) If equal transfers were observed throughout the transfer process, the Soviet stockpile would be depleted first;
- (3) Proportional transfers would, therefore, be more realistic and negotiable;
- (4) Our proposal would show the earnestness of the U.S. desire to reach agreement; and
- (5) It would convey the U.S. nuclear superiority to other nations, some of which were persuaded by the Soviet Union that it had a larger nuclear force.

e. Nuclear Free Zones

We may reaffirm the willingness of the United States to cooperate to limit the spread of national nuclear capabilities by supporting nuclear free zones in accordance with the general criteria which the United States has already stated. These criteria include the following:

- (1) The initiative should come from within the area concerned;
- (2) It should include all States in the area, if possible;
- (3) It should not upset the existing military balance; and,

4. It

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- (4) It should be subject to adequate verification and inspection.

Consistent with those principles, the United States would oppose ENDC consideration of specific zones for particular areas because we feel it would be inappropriate for the Conference to go beyond the general principles of a measure which concerns only some states, particularly when all of those states are not represented at the Conference. An attempt to deal in detail with measures applicable to specific regions risks making the ENDC a forum for the airing of regional political disputes.

f. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

We will restate our goal of achieving a ban on all nuclear weapons tests under effective international control. We do not intend to pursue this matter actively, however, and we do not believe the Soviets will do so either, because of our basic and continuing differences over verification requirements. If there is pressure from the non-aligned members of the ENDC to discuss a comprehensive ban, we have under consideration a suggestion for technical talks between Soviet and U.S. experts next summer on detection and identification of seismic events. As you know, the Soviet Union has never given any persuasive scientific reasons to support its contention that inspections are not essential to the verification process.

II. Non-Nuclear Proposals

1. In order to halt further acceleration of the arms race at the present time, the United States is considering a proposal that this country and the Soviet Union, together with all others who may wish to do so, agree to an exploration of the possibility of a verified freeze of the

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number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. Such a cutoff would involve nuclear delivery systems and include ABM's.

2. As one of the measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack, we are presently consulting with our NATO Allies on the possible establishment of a system of observation posts at transportation centers, seaports, etc. Such posts would have the primary utility of permitting us to observe sudden or massive conventional military movements. Proposals for the establishment of such posts have been discussed with the Soviet Union ever since 1955 and the concept is not new. We may table specific proposals following the consultations with our Allies.

3. As you know, Chairman Khrushchev wrote President Johnson on December 31, 1963 concerning an agreement prohibiting the use of force in settling territorial or boundary disputes. As I indicated to you over the telephone, the President's reply will probably be made public Monday.

Although this is a matter which may not be of as direct concern to the Committee as some of the foregoing subjects, I think you should know what the nature of our response will be. In his reply, the President will agree with Chairman Khrushchev that the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or country. He will point out that in consultation with our Allies, the United States will be prepared to discuss means of prohibiting the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, -- whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms-- to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory; or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities. These guidelines are broader and stronger than those proposed by Chairman Khrushchev.

In addition,

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In addition, the President's letter urges that both the United States and the Soviet Union present new proposals at Geneva in pursuit of our long range objective of reducing the risk of war. The President's letter makes extremely general reference to the proposals now being considered by the U.S. and set forth in detail above.

I hope this information will be helpful to you. If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

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